Using European Union funds involves a complex process; Member States must adhere to wide-ranging EU and domestic legislation, non-compliance can lead to irregularities. Besides accordance with the letter of the law, also the general EU budgetary principles, in particular sound fi nancial management, must be given full consideration. Th e paper presents Hungary's evolving approach to handling irregularities and her experience in creating the corresponding legal and institutional framework. Th e research also assesses how the perspective of the European Commission, in particular of its auditors, has contributed to legal uncertainties.
Introduction
In the period 2014 -2020 Hungary receives over Euro 25 billion from the European Structural and Investments Funds (ESIF), the legal and regular implementation of these funds bears critical importance. A key element is the ability to absorb EU funds for cohesion, which is defi ned as "the capability of a region or member state to allocate and to fully spend the fi nancial resources under cohesion policy in an effi cient and eff ective way" (Dragan 2008; Horvat 2005) ; it measures the extent to which a state / region is able to fully spend the allocated fi nancial resources from the EU funds in an eff ective and effi cient way (Kopeva et al. 2011) . Governments deployed eff orts to prevent and manage the defi ciency of absorption capacity (Horvat and Maier 2004) and absorption bottlenecks (Kalman 2002) .
Whereas there is a most extensive literature evaluating the implementation of Cohesion Policy, in comparison with its signifi cance, the functionality and key ingredients of its compliance enforcement regime have enjoyed examination at a somewhat lower intensity. Studies articulate the correlation between simplifi cation, compliance and performance (Davies 2015; Mike and Balás 2015) , the importance of legal certainty in the fi nancial control and audit of the funds (Meuleman and Brenninkmeije 2017) , the role of the accountability framework (Koedijk 2016 ) and the weight of administrative and institutional capacity (among others Šumpíková et al. 2005, Mendez and Bachtler 2017) .
Unauthorised and irregular use of assistance in a project may undermine reaching its goals, moreover -at a programme level -it may divert aid from other important investments (Jurevičienė and Pileckaitė 2013) . Detecting, investigating and sanctioning non-compliance tie up the delivery institutions greatly, and pending irregularities deepen programme-level fi nancial management risks. Th e importance of an adequate irregularity regime cannot be overstated. Global challenges, increasing political pressure, media 4 and public attention have led to the continued tightening of general and irregularity-specifi c norms, compounded by a complete recalibration of the institutional set-up with each programming period in Hungary (Nyikos 2012 ), doubtless to be revisited for the post-2020 era.
Since the early 2000s, there has been a huge growth in the complexity of regulations, related directly or indirectly (e.g. horizontal policies) to Cohesion Policy implementation. 5 Th is course has been driven signifi cantly by the intention to improve fi nancial management and control of the funds (Davies and Polverari 2011) and characterised the blurring of hard law and soft law, as evidenced in the broader EU governance context, too (Grazianoa and Halpern 2015) . Benefi ciaries' inability to capture and cope with the patchwork of rules spur frustration and resistance (Jouen 2008 ) and erode legality, as none of the conditions the OECD defi ned as a minimum factor to compliance (suffi cient degree of knowledge of, willingness and ability to comply with the rules by the target groups; Parker 2000) materialised. European Commission audits have played a critical role in the rising rigidity (Nyikos 2011) ; the legal development of corresponding fi nancial corrections refl ect the aim of protecting compliance through deterrence (Łacny 2017) . A study warned that uncorroborated audit fi ndings, when enforced through the ultimate power of fi nancial sanctions, propel risk-evasiness, the introduction of further constraints thus reinforcing the viscious circle (AAM Consulting 2012). Pressure has also proven harmful in terms of encouraging more focus on procedures rather than on the underlying content (Wostner 2007) . Irregularities occur using EU funds in public procurement and problems linked with cronyism, which are the key vulnerable areas where the corruption occurs (Suwaj 2005) .
European legislation provides for the protection of the Union's fi nancial interests in all aspects. An error is any breach of rules, an unintentional mistake which does not mean that funds have been lost, wasted or abused. Th e term is not covered by the antifraud norms.
6 Irregularity means any infringement of a provision of European law which has, or would have, the eff ect of prejudicing the general budget of the European Union or budgets managed by it. Non-compliant spending leads to a less effi cient and / or eff ective use of public funds and it could cause damage to the budget. It is notable that breaches of both EU law and national law are relevant, and it is enough if there is a potential prejudice to the EU's budget, it is not necessary to prove that an actual loss to the budget in fact occurred. A fraud implies intentional deception , it aff ects the European Communities' fi nancial interests and consists of 7 , in respect of expenditure, any intentional act or omission relating to:
• the use or presentation of false, incorrect or incomplete statements or documents which leads to the misappropriation or wrongful retention of EU budget; • non-disclosure of information in violation of a specifi c obligation, with the same eff ect; • the misapplication of funds for purposes other than those originally approved.
Th e concept of irregularity is much wider than that of fraud. Th e latter constitutes a criminal act which is established by judicial proceedings. Th erefore, the 6 For the employment of the term "error", see the European Court of Auditors' Annual Report of the European Court of Auditors on the implementation of the budget concerning the fi nancial year 2009, OJ C 303 / 02, 9. 11. 2010. Because of the different methods to collect the data, the European Court of Auditors and the Commission agree that the fi gures of the European Court of Auditors on errors and of the Commission on irregularities and fi nancial corrections cannot be compared in a meaningful way (OJ C 303 / 02, 9. 11. 2010, point 1.50, 32, 33) . On the methodology of the Court, see Annex 1.1 (Audit Approach and Methodology) OJ C 303 / 02, 9. 11. 2010, 34. fi nancial damage of fraudulent practices can only be determined once the judicial procedure has come to an end. Th e legal defi nition and interpretation of irregularities have aff ected the volume of cases, risks and the corresponding institutional setting. Th e construction of its meaning refl ects both that i.) provisions in the EU legislation have evolved over time and ii.) national governments may have expanded the defi nition in the national legislation.
In the period 2004 -2006 the Community law solely ruled on the EU budget interest. Also the interpretation of loss to the EU budget needed clarifi cation. Th e concept of actual loss enjoyed a widely shared understanding; it referred to an irregularity which has only been detected aft er the reimbursement of the underlying expenditure was reimbursed from the budget. Consequently, the budget bore expenses that it should not have paid for, due to their irregular nature. However, defi ning a potential loss to the budget created many diffi culties. Th is notion assumed that the breach of the rules could have theoretically aff ected expenditure paid by the budget. Th e interpretation of the term largely impacted the recording, investigating, reporting, correcting and recovering of irregularities. Neither the EU nor the Hungarian legislation defi ned the earliest starting point of a potential irregularity. Interpretation varied, some intermediate bodies took the date of the submission of the project proposal. Th is approach lengthened the process for a formal rejection of the application. Substantial diff erences prevailed in statistical data originating from Member States which held that an irregularity only relates to reimbursed expenditure and must be confi rmed by relevant administrative / judicial proceedings and from countries that employed a much broader interpretation of an irregularity and also accomplished their investigations in a relatively short period of time under administrative proceedings.
Furthermore, as an additional complication, the practice set up for the European Rural Development Funds in Hungary greatly diverged from the mechanisms under the Structural and Cohesion Funds: an irregularity implied a formal administrative decision giving eff ect to the right to recover undue public assistance. Differences across the funds became tangible. In a 2006 audit report 8 Hungary, among various other Member States 9 , was suggested to address the "lack of clarity as to what constitutes an irregularity". Additionally, the report warned of the need to distinguish between breaches of the norms with evidenced public fi nancial loss and violations with no impact on the budget.
A special case is an irregularity related to fi nancial instruments (FI) 10 ; the latter support economically viable investments through loans, guarantees, equity and other risk-bearing mechanisms (Nyikos and Soós 2018) . Th e possibility to re-invest the revolving funds off ers greater fl exibility. Th e fund manager can remove irregular items before the payment claim is sent to the European Commission. Th e uncharged expense is recovered by the benefi ciary, nonetheless irregularity does not trigger loss at the closure of the instrument. Blending two types of fi nancial support (grants and FIs) implies that an irregularity in one component may aff ect progress in the other.
Th e research on the evolution of Hungary's irregularity system is based on the relevant past and present legislation, literatures, evaluations and the experiences of the authors in order to collect and assess the relevant factors which may infl uence the results the use of EU Cohesion Policy funds bring about. Th e regulatory and institutional environment strongly aff ects the likelihood of irregularities; national and EU control and audit reports, irregularity documentation refl ect the actual occurrence, nature and impact of non-compliance cases. Information collection and validation rely on a range of further sources, including European and national regulations, offi cial websites and annual reports, scientifi c literature, and last, but not least, a great array of interviews with Cohesion Policy experts.
Our method has been broken down into two steps. First, aft er the defi nition of irregularities we analysed the Hungarian regulatory, administrative and delivery regime of the EU funds in the period 2004 -2018. Special attention was given to the issues linked to preventing and managing irregularities. In particular, changes in the government structure and adequate administrative capacity are looked at, followed by an analysis of their impact on Hungary's eff ective use of EU funds (Nyikos 2013) . Secondly, we examined the evolution of the relevant legal framework linked to EU funds and irregularities. We assessed the data on irregularities in order to measure Hungary's performance and identify improvement needs, especially in light of the new "rule of law" initiative proposed by the European Commission. Whereas the present study principally attempts to systemise the Hungarian experience, the relationship between compliance enforcement and the effi cacy of EU-funded public policy interventions has received growing attention in both EU institutions and Member State, and it is placed high on the agenda of the 2021 -2027 legislative proposal negotiations. Furthermore, the discourse is not confi ned to Europe; uncertainties regarding the legal basis of federal grant assistance (Walker 1997) or (non-compliance related) dispute settlement structures and procedures (Marque 2011 ) constitute a reoccurring issue in the United States, as well.
The evolution of the regulatory framework in Hungary
Th is chapter off ers a brief overview of the evolution of both the general legal-institutional framework Hungary has adopted for implementing the EU Cohesion Policy and the irregularity system it has built up to deal with the irregular use of the funds. It explains the main considerations for the continued recalibration of this delivery environment, the steps the Hungarian Authorities had to take to resolve systemic problems, the result of these interventions, and it also presents noncompliance handling issues yet to be resolved.
In the draft legislation for the 2021 -2027 budgetary period, the European Commission proposes a new requirement, namely the rule of law conditionality.
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Its clarity and objectivity, however, are still being widely discussed. Additionally, cohesion policy conditionalities have always contained an obligation for the proper functioning of the institutions -including the courts. Nonetheless, the European Commission has not previously examined the performance of the courts in relation to proceeding irregularity and recovery disputes although Member States have met diffi culties when they attempted to embed the irregularity and recovery managment functions in their national legislation.
Th is chapter summarises the evolution of national regulatory environment for irregularities. Domestic rules play a pre-decisive role in dictating the general legal relationship for the provision of fi nancial assistance including the handling of irregularities and recoveries, assigning the corresponding rights and obligations to the fi nanciers (represented by the managing authorities) and benefi ciaries. Meanwhile the quality of the regulations (clarity, consistency, completeness) infl uences the solidity of decisions and enforcement of sanctions. Th e national legal basis has developed over the years; notably periodic re-examinations have been undertaken to incorporate the knowledge enriched by experience and to respond to the emerging problems the chapter will present. Nonetheless, the interplay of this public-lawbased legislative framework with civil law ruling the conclusion and satisfaction of grant contracts has generated growing diffi culties for appeals.
General approach to managing the funds and irregularities
Th e Pre-Accession Funds paved the way for implementing Cohesion Policy via institutional capacity-building and modelling the implementation of the funds. Th e ex-ante controlled pre-accession system off ered little opportunity to pilot the handling of irregularities under the shared management regime though. Th e National Development Plan of Hungary briefl y mentions the term; the 2004 -2006 domestic regulations did not off er much detail either; minimum standards were only adopted in 2005. Perceived security came from excessive administrative rules, high collateral requirements, and long delays in public procurement processes, which postponed the recognition of varied interpretations.
12 Furthermore, the delivery system had limited exposure to external audits. Th ese factors added up to a low level of risk recognition. Challenges were addressed case by case, as they arose, without the employment of systematic legal solutions.
Managing Authorities (MA) bore the general responsibility for implementing the operational programme and, as part of it, managing the irregularity system. Th ey had to secure funding for the repayment to the EU budget (from the national budget reserves) before recovery from the benefi ciary was accomplished.
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Managing Authorities delegated many of their functions to the 22 intermediate bodies (IB) which essentially satisfi ed the project-level tasks including dealing with irregularities, too.
Th e winding-up body (an independent control body to audit the delivery system and projects), being the Government Control Offi ce in Hungary, was limited to informing the managing authorities on suspected irregularities (5 -15 % control checks); only later was it empowered to state irregularities. Th e Paying Authority (PA), in charge of certifying expenditure and submitting applications for payment to the Commmission, followed up fi nancial control and audit processes and coordinated with the MAs and IBs. Th e OLAF Coordination Offi ce collected information and reported on irregularities, meanwhile off ering guidance and training to help recognise potential fraud. Th e police, the prosecution, the courts and the Public Procurement Arbitration Board played an important role in the investigation, judgment and treatment of irregularities that fell under criminal law or the public procurement law.
When preparing for the period 2007 -2013, a strong emphasis was placed on institutional and operational effi ciency. Th e newly created National Development Agency hosted all managing authorities, and the new national regulations laid down unifi ed standards for programme delivery. Irregularities received little importance initially. By the early 2010s their number rose alarmingly; intensifying EC audits strongly criticised Hungary's failures to check and ensure that beneficiaries comply fully with the public procurement rules . Subsequent fi nancial corrections called for high-level intervention, managing irregularities ceased to be treated as a technical matter. Th e new Government (2010) initiated a full-scale revision.
Th e organisation of political coordination 14 was redefi ned. Managing authorities received reinforced responsibilities for directing and controlling a reduced number of IBs. A single set of implementing rules replaced the fragmented, ev-12 Primary source of irregularities up to date.
13 As the CSF Managing Authority was in charge of the use of technical assistance monies related to the implementation of the CSF, its duties included corresponding recovery. A similar obligation was ascribed to the Cohesion Fund IB.
er-sprawling regulations. Th e provisions on irregularities were upgraded signifi cantly, the introduction of the right to appeal bettered the substantiation of decisions. Besides, appalling diff erences in the recovery rate called for action. Principally the operational programmes 15 which focused on public-sector target groups, where the techniques of direct reduction from the payment claim or direct collection 16 were in place, progressed with the repayments satisfactorily. Th ey achieved a close to 100 % recovery rate. Other programmes presented outstanding delays. Eventually the National Tax and Customs Administration was appointed to recover the funds as overdue tax reinforced by its right to "delete a company's registration number", this measure instantly terminates the trading of the fi rm.
For the 2014 -2020 period a complete transformation of the delivery system implied that managing authorities and most intermediate bodies were reinstiuted into the line ministries.
17 Sectoral policy responsibilities received crisp articulation in the new national regulations. Th e Minister in charge of the EU Funds was appointed to supervise implementation, supported by a Central Coordination Unit holding signifi cant powers. Th e Government decree 18 passed in autumn 2014 comprises standardised implementing provisions, national eligibility rules and a unifi ed operational manual. Cutting red tape in collateral requirements necessitated that the means to recover the misused public funds are solidifi ed.
Detailed rules apply to the investigation and treatment of irregularities. Th e process always starts with an alert by an institution or offi cial in the management and control system; the signal is then followed up by the managing authority. Th e irregularity examination process may require coordination with external agencies or authorities and / or spur the discontinuation of the payment of fi nancial assistance. Th e decision whether compliance or rather the violation of the norms and fi nancial loss were evidenced rests with the head of the MA. Th e benefi ciary may request a re-examination; during the appeal process, save the halting of payments, the legal consequences are suspended. Depending on the nature of the case, the managing authority may waive the benefi ciary's repayment obligation; in case of a negative appeal judgment, however, interest is charged on the unpaid "debt". , public administrative procedures formed the legal grounds for the receipt of EU funds.
Regulations for implementing the funds and handling irregularities
For the period 2007 -2013 the nature of the regulatory framework remained unchanged: fragmented rules and an institution system with more than 25 executing bodies and overlapping regulations led to tangible departures in legal interpretation.
Th e complete mid-term revision encompassed the irregularity system. 21 Observations included weaknesses of the multilevel regulatory environment; despite the legislative hierarchy neither legal dogmatics nor application of the rules evidenced the regulatory intent of coherence and legal consistency. Particular insufficiencies contained the lack of
• clarity on institutional duties and their embeddedness in the national public and civil law systems, • certainty on public authority power, legal nature of grant assistance limiting the right to appeal, • defi ned authority of the courts in case public fi nancial assistance cases are tried, • procedures for coordinating with bodies 22 whose decisions impact 23 on the regularity of the funds. 24 Another important observation focused on the relationship between the management verifi cation and the irregularity systems. Empirical evidence, which was obtained for the preparation of the study, suggested that the irregularity system actually replaced underperforming fi rst-level control functions. This practice was strongly recommended to be brought to a halt in order to give way to the parallel upgrading of these two inter-related regimes. Th e need to introduce substantial changes became inevitable. In 2010 a unifi ed government decree 25 was introduced, off ering a clear distribution of tasks between MAs and IBs, detailed provisions on public-procurement compliance checks, complaints and irregularities. Benefi ciaries could challenge decisions at any stage of the administrative process.
For the period 2014 -2020 the Government radically recalibrated the programming architecture, the legislative and institutional environment and enacted a new government decree 26 in autumn 2014.
Legal relationship with the benefi ciary, the problem of the legal regime
Th e importance of the legal relationship between the benefi ciary and the managing authority lies in the guarantees it off ers for the enforcement of -fi nancialsanctions, should an irregularity be established, whereas it also gives the right to benefi ciaries to challenge such a decision. Its terms and conditions derive from the governing legal regime, the eff ectiveness of which has a signifi cant infl uence on how these rights and obligations are fulfi lled. Problems, however, quickly become reoccurring, and legal diffi culties multiply with the interplay of various legal regimes.
Legal issues related to the award, use and repayment of public fi nancial assistance in Hungary are partly covered by administrative law and partly fall within the civil legal system with important overlappings.
Academic literature in Hungary has applied greater weight to the public source of law. Public-policy objectives spur public authorities to allocate fi nancial assistance via their redistributive functions; the recovery of aid is based on public-fi nance law. Th e effi cient and eff ective use of budget funding is in the public interest, even if it takes the form of a private investment. Th erefore, public-fi nance law dominates the process, covering the award decision, release of assistance, reporting, recovery and fi nancial control.
However, the absorption of EU Funds has been accompanied by a dynamically growing array of support forms. Contractual arrangements are based on civil law with several elements from public fi nance law. Th is complexity negatively aff ects the transparency of the legal structure of the relationship between the parties (fi nancier and benefi ciary 27 ) and the application of the rules.
Th e legal relationship between the managing authority and the benefi ciary starts with entering into a legally binding agreement which may take the forms of i.) a grant contract, ii.) a grant letter and iii.) a public administrative decision.
In the period 2007 -2013 the EARDF grant provider MA in Hungary acted as a public authority under administrative law, adopting public administrative decisions, while the ERDF, ESF and Cohesion Funds MAs acted under civil law and issued grant contracts and grant letters.
For the ERDF, ESF and Cohesion Fund the contract which the two parties signed was governed by the Civil Code, from the day of its conclusion up to its termination. Th ese terms were clearly expressed in the 2007 -2013 implementing provisions, doubtless as a reaction to the uncertainty the legal status of the grant contract had caused earlier. To simplify, managing authorities introduced and issued grant letters as a one-sided act. A grant letter sets forth all the conditions attached to implementing the funds, which the benefi ciary formally accepts through the submission of the grant application. Grant letters are regimented by civil, in particular contract, law, too.
Diff erent provisions applied to EARDF assistance in the period 2007 -2013 . Th e general rule dictated that the award of fi nancial support is based on a formal public administrative decision. Public administrative decisions must be public-authority-related, namely determining rights or obligations for addressees, verifying data, facts or eligibility, maintaining offi cial records and carrying out controls. Th e managing authority satisfi ed all these functions; moreover, a decision on an application for fi nancial assistance implies the determination of rights and duties. Consequently, the formal criteria for a public administrative proceeding were fully met.
Th e broader legal environment, the appropriate regulatory framework, gains utmost importance if a benefi ciary fails to fulfi l the contractual obligations or the misuse of funds is evidenced, triggering the recovery of public moneys. Th e legal status of the irregularity decision directly infl uences the right of the benefi ciary to challenge this decision as well as being a vital component for the effi ciency of the corrective measures the managing authority puts in place.
In the EARDF regime when projects are approved via an administrative proceeding the law records the need to conclude an irregularity decision in the form of an administrative proceeding. Two procedures can be distinguished: i.) administrative decision with immediate eff ect 28 , whereby no right of appeal is provided, enti-tlement of the benefi ciary for fi nancial support terminates, entirely or partially, and ii.) withdrawal of the previous decision on the award of fi nancial assistance associated with the right to appeal; the outcome of the second-tier decision shall prevail.
Civil courts have inherent jurisdiction to try irregularity-related sanctions imposed on benefi ciaries. However, there was no uniform understanding of the authority civil courts held in such cases and the position only started to be confi rmed by actual court practice in the early 2010s.
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Ambiguity in the legal provisions led to multiple interpretations regarding the position of the managing authority when it commences proceedings to formally establish the irregularity and deal with its consequences. Managing authorities argued that their co-ordinated, equal legal standing with the benefi ary within the grant contract does not convert into an identical relationship within irregularity disputes. Th eir duty to seek and guard the interest of the EU and national budgets, the obligations stemming from the EU legislation and imposed on them as functions to be satisfi ed by the national authorities, play out as essential drivers to their conduct. With the signature of the grant contract, the benefi ciary acknowledges and accepts the right of the managing authority to exercise power, including the establishment of irregularities and the enforcement of legal and fi nancial consequences accordingly. Also jurisdictions contained opinions which noted that benefi ciaries obtained public funds through a call-for-proposals system, whereby all implementing conditions derived from regulations. Th e autonomy of the benefi ciaries was thus limited to accepting or rejecting the contractual terms (and the funding off er).
Consequently, the relevant current Hungarian regulations state for every type of national public and EU funded assistance that the selection and the recovery / repay process is based on the public-fi nance law with a civil contract concluded between the parties.
Th e update of the delivery terms for the EU funds extended to the challenge of the irregularity decision. A second tier to the irregularity system was introduced to address the request of benefi ciaries for an administrative review of the fi rst-level decision. As the appeal decision does not constitute a public administrative proceeding, the implementing decree does not entitle the benefi ciary to fi le an appeal against this second-tier decision (on the irregularity itself or the recovery of undue assistance) to the court. Nonetheless, on the consideration of the legal relation between the managing authority and the benefi ciary being governed by civil law, benefi ciaries can fi le a civil lawsuit against the second-tier position. In this case, they do not compel the decision itself but allege the cancellation of the grant contract 30 requesting the continuation of funding to the project.
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Th ese provisions are not in line with the rule of law and seem to be unconstitutional as Hungary's Fundamental Law (Article XXVIII) rules that "(1) Everyone shall have the right to have any charge against him or her, or his or her rights and obligations in any litigation, adjudicated within a reasonable time in a fair and public trial by an independent and impartial court established by an Act" and " (7) Everyone shall have the right to seek legal remedy against any court, authority or other administrative decision which violates his or her rights or legitimate interests. " Additionally, Article 25 (2) specifi es that "Courts shall decide on a) criminal matters, civil disputes and on other matters specifi ed in an Act. "
Th e rule-of-law principle dictates that benefi ciaries obtain the right to challenge the irregularity decision of the managing authority. Also the effi ciency of the appeal regime determines the time required for settling a dispute and recovering undue assistance. Court proceedings take many years, conserving uncertainty and feared to decrease the probability of an eff ective recovery. A performance audit by the National Audit Offi ce 32 of 2010 noted that settling an appeal took an average of 3 years.
Additionally, the status of Commission guidelines is yet unresolved, the national rules do not off er techniques for their treatment. As an example, the guidelines to be applied for irregularities related to public procurement defi ne the amounts and rates of fi nancial corrections (Nyikos and Sóos 2016) . Although the guidelines do not constitute legislation, both the Commission services and Member State authorities have to adhere to them. Other concerns include their retroactive employment and legally expansive nature: the guidance must be based on EU law to provide clarifi cation for the practicacl implementation of the ruled. However, these guidances repeatedly go beyond the regulation. 
Hungarian irregularity data and trends
Statistical data as of 31 January 2018 confi rm that documents-based checks constitute the principal instrument to reveal irregularities (59 % of all cases). Timely investigation is essential to the pace of the recovery process. When an investigation confi rms full compliance in a project, the "return to normalcy" should take place instantly. Cases are very diff erent, of course. Certain types of issues take almost no time to process; highly complex, specialised problems require a longer examination. Th e maximum length of investigation dropped markedly over the years, concluding an irregularity takes less than a day in 20 % of the cases. Nevertheless, the average examination time remained unchanged. Th e volume of reported irregularities stood at a relatively low level in the period 2004 -2008; however, it rocketed in 2009 . Th e number of cases grew fi vefold, and the rate of assistance impacted by irregularities soared eightfold. A steady rise of irregularities followed, and by the end of the programming period a strong concentration became apparent in the economic development and regional operational programmes. Recovery rates ranged from 8 % 34 to 157 % across the entire programming architecture.
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At present, comparisons are hard to make, as mass-scale project implementation started only in 2016 and the fi rst irregularity was noted on 10 May 2016.
33 However, the value for the rate of investigations accomplished within 50 days is 54 %.
34 Economic Development OP.
35 Outstanding recoveries were subject to penalty interest rates. Transport (all public procurement) 7
Environment (all public procurement) 7
Public Administration 3
Territorial and Settlement Development 9
Competitive Central Hungary 4
Total 100
Source: Based on data from the Prime Minister's Offi ce, 31 January 2018
As the above table illustrates, the spread of irregularities across the operational programmes is rather uneven, the Economic Competitiveness and Innovation OP holds a dominant share of irregularity cases. Th is is partly due to the quick start of this programme inducing the launch of a large number of projects as well as the particular diffi culties (bankruptcy, liquidation, ownership transformation etc.) private sector benefi ciaries struggle with.
Sources of irregularities
Sources of irregularities have long fallen into a limited number of categories. Most of the irregularities are linked to public procurement (29 %) and ineligible expenditure (30 %). Th e present over-representation of the Economic Competitiveness and Innovation OP came with the rising challenges (e.g. liquidation, bankruptcy and other processes) benefi ciary fi rms have to struggle with. Breach of public procurement rules account for a very high proportion of repayments. Operational programmes with public-sector benefi ciaries and large-scale procurements are particularly "vulnerable" to non-compliance. Since the mid-2000s, the nature of non-conformity has moved from the employment of inadequate procedures to restricting competition and sound fi nancial management, its lack of defi nition re-occurs with each public procurement audit. Neither pure reference to this principle nor the observation of reduced competition helps to understand how the fundamental concept should translate into practice. Auditors' observations on restrictions to equal and fair competion display great procedural variations in terms of the size of evidenced market interest, the signs of any perceived inhibit to entry (e.g. ex-ante settlement request, appeals) or the ratio of the planned vs. actual tender value . Growing concerns are refl ected in the paper 36 compiled by the Legal Interpretation Analysing Group of the Supreme Court, noting that the principle of sound fi nancial management, ingrained in Hungary's Public Procurement Law, is diffi cult to interpret. It is not applicable as a general clause, it is of economic rather than legal content, and it does not trigger a legal impact. Appraising the soundess of management practices is subjective, which cannot be scientifi cally or empirically measured, its boundaries cannot be defi ned. Th erefore, attaching legal consequences to this criterion is perceived as a rather ambitious attempt.
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Market prices have recently received critical audit observations. For purchases via public procurement, the outcome of the competition is generally accepted as the market price. For items / services with a value below the public procurement threshold, a diff erent approach has been taken. Th e Hungarian rules on eligibility dictate that any expenditure which the benefi ciaries submit must follow the market prices. A failure to off er hard evidence on the adequacy of the prices provokes the rejection of the expense as ineligible. A range of instruments has recently been put in to help benefi ciaries, simplify the assessment of the price range and reduce audit risks. Th ese include the use of three independent quotes, the employment of capped budget categories, unit prices or reference to offi cial rates. Ensuring an acceptable price range needs robust checks and proper documentation of the probings. At present, a 20 % departure from the perceived market price is allowed.
Th e risk of irregularities remained high as the root problems are manifold. Grant culture inspires benefi ciaries to maximise funding opportunities. Market prices constantly change and refl ect the information on the availability of sizeable public funds. Labour market changes, lack of skilled workers and demand propelled by the cyclical nature of programmes have led to rising costs. Comparisons with previous public tenders are becoming irrelevant.
Th ese complications are evidently not unique to Hungary. It is tempting to address the symptoms, and fi nancial corrections imposed on the Member States indeed do so, nonetheless only fi nding and reacting to the root of the problems could radically improve the regularity of the funds.
The "new" approach: Rule of law
Aft er analysing the evolution and the particular Hungarian context and understanding the importance of the proper and legal functioning of the implementation system, this chapter takes stock of the main considerations for the future of the irregularity system with a view to the new rule of law conditionality under the 2020+ Cohesion Policy.
Th e use of conditionalities in Cohesion Policy has been signifi cantly extended (Nyikos 2014) to date, containing macroeconomic conditionality, ex-ante conditionalities (and are proposed to be further widened in the next period with the infringement conditionality). Th e exisiting conditionalities and legislative provisions dictate the obligations which the implementing entities of the Member States, including the organs in charge of managing irregularities, have to satisfy, and should these duties be in need of enforcement, the Commission is equipped with eff ective instruments to terminate or suspend payments. For the regular implementation of Cohesion Policy, the proper functioning of the relevant institutional system has always served as a pre-requisite. Due to irregularities, in a broader sense the judiciary has also formed part of the implementation system . Nonetheless, the European Commission has not previously examined the functioning of the courts in relation to the irregularity and recovery cases, although embedding these functions into the national legislation has gone beyond being a solely Hungarian problem (Talaga and Nyikos 2014) .
Th e 2021 -2027 legislative proposals present a new rule of law conditionality 38 as a stand-alone, cross-cutting requirement applicable to all EU budget expenditure, including Cohesion Policy. Th e provisions comprise conditions specifi c to Cohesion Policy as well as EU legal principles, constitutional rights and requirements deriving from the concept of the rule of law. As mentioned earlier, there has been no attempt by the European Commmission so far to subject the exercising of the judicial functions in Cohesion Policy related cases to scrutiny. Th e proposal provoked both political and legal debates, principal concerns relate to the transparency, clarity and objectivity of the rule of law provisions.
Benefi ciaries enjoy the constitutional right to fi le a claim in an independent and impartial court. Th e absence of this protection would violate their constitutional rights and may also raise fears among them about the political infl uence which at the second level of the administrative disputes' resolution may occur. Th e scrutiny of the legality of the sanctions by the independent judiciary bears essential importance, as recorded in the European Convention of Human Rights, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the Treaties and refl ected by Court practice.
39 Th e existing instruments, the actual Commission and Court practices raise dilemmas about what value added the new provisions will off er. Furthermore, the present wording of the legislative proposal does not off er suffi cient clarity on the nature, gravity and scope of the generalised defi ciency which may trigger the Commission's intervention; regulatory conditions, instead of promoting the noble goal of safeguarding the rule of law, may become a powerful political instrument. Appropriately, the opinion of the European Court of Auditors confi rms the need for substantiating a judgment of defi ciency with specifi c criteria. 
Discussion
Th is chapter provides for a short summary of the signifi cant points made earlier in relation to the key milestones the evolution of the irregularity system in Hungary has shown so far and the outstanding issues yet to be resolved.
Since its fi rst programming period, Hungary has notably stabilised its irregularity structures and mechanisms, including the continued development of the regulatory and administrative framework. Th is progress has been largely inspired by the growing exposure to administrative and fi nancial sanctions. Accordingly continued eff orts contributed to improved institutional capacity and the introduction of specifi c instruments and techniques to deal with high-risk areas, whereas the launch of an appeal system advanced the protection of benefi ciaries. However, the process is far from complete. Th e long-known need to resolve the nature of the legal relationship between grantee and the grant provider has become inevitable. Th e Hungarian appeal system needs to be re-examined, since available administrative dispute procedures do not replace the full-scale judicial oversight, a last-resort protection in the Constitution.
Th e EU legislation has dictated the ingrained authority of the European Commission to discontinue the transfer of Cohesion Policy funds, should systemic shortcoming be recognised in a Member State. Discussions on the irregularity and appeal systems have been ongoing between the Commission and the Hungarian Authorities, yet the approach to accessible dispute resolution and justice has presented ambiguity and inconsistencies over time.
Th is leads to the rule-of-law principle, the employment of which requires utmost precision in terms of the clarity of specifi c requirements Member States are obliged to fulfi l when using Cohesion Policy funds. In addition, the in-depth analysis and addressing of the root problems, which repeatedly invoke irregularities, yet awaits. Th e current fi nancial implementation and control regime (annuality) has not rectifi ed the long-lasting diffi culties. Non-conformity has not ceased to trouble managing authorities. Out of fear to induce systemic irregularities if non-compliance of spending is revealed aft er the annual accounts are submitted, they reduce their risks by excluding the feared items. Treating a symptom is very far from fi xing the problem. Without the latter, national budget will bear the burden; legal uncertainty will not be removed either. Last but not least simplifi cation and compliance strongly correlate. New methodologies are required to provoke the regulatory concept at both EU and national levels, identify redundancies and push forward towards a really radical cutback of red tape.
